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Abstract
Two new properties of a finite strategic game, strong and weak BR-dominance
solvability, are introduced. The first property holds, e.g., if the game is strongly
dominance solvable or if it is weakly dominance solvable and all best responses are
unique. It ensures that every simultaneous best response adjustment path, as well
as every non-discriminatory individual best response improvement path, reaches
a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The second property holds, e.g.,
if the game is weakly dominance solvable; it ensures that every strategy profile
can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path
and with an individual best response path (if there are more than two players,
unmotivated switches from one best response to another may be needed). In a
two person game, weak BR-dominance solvability is necessary for the acyclicity of
simultaneous best response adjustment paths, as well as for the acyclicity of best
response improvement paths provided the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular.
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1 Introduction
The two strands of game theory listed in the title have two things in common. First,
some dynamic notions are involved in both cases. Second, both can be developed in
a purely ordinal framework although are equally applicable to mixed extensions. They
radically differ in their assumptions about the rationality of the players.
Dominance solvability (Moulin, 1979) presupposes a high degree of sophistication.
Each player is able to analyze the whole game and anticipate the results of similar
analyses by the partners. Actually, there are two versions of the property, strong and
weak ones. The elimination of strongly dominated strategies does not change, say, the
set of Nash equilibria. The elimination of weakly dominated strategies is not at all
innocuous (Samuelson, 1992), but, nonetheless, is often regarded as legitimate.
Individual myopic adaptation, on the contrary, is natural when the players’ rational-
ity is bounded and they have to rely on “local” considerations. Actually, best response
dynamics were considered by A.-A. Cournot long before the expression “game theory”
came into use. Similar processes in various contexts were studied by Topkis (1979),
Bernheim (1984), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
Connections between dominance solvability and the convergence of Cournot taton-
nement were examined by Moulin (1984). It turned out that the former usually implies
the latter; in a rather special case, an equivalence was established. Dominance was weak
although the assumption of unique best responses made it “not so weak.” Two scenarios
of tatonnement were considered: simultaneous and sequential (with a fixed order of the
players).
In a sense, this paper returns to the same subject with a newer toolbox. Although
none of the results is strikingly dissimilar to those of Moulin (1984), a much more detailed
picture of “what depends on what” is obtained. For technical convenience, we only
consider finite games, where we can essentially restrict ourselves to finite improvement
(or adjustment) paths; in a continuous game, this would be insufficient. Similarly,
in a finite game dominated strategies can be eliminated one at a time, which gives
considerable technical freedom; in a continuous game, we have to delete strategies en
mass, and even then cannot expect a finite number of eliminations to be sufficient.
Concerning adaptive dynamics, we consider both (best response) improvements as
defined by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and Milchtaich (1996), and simultaneous best
response adjustments. The former cover sequential tatonnement of Moulin (1984); it
should also be noted that sufficient conditions for the convergence of more complicated
scenarios of adaptation or evolution can be formulated in terms of such improvement
paths (Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Milchtaich, 1996; Friedman and Mezzetti,
2001). The language of binary relations, suggested in Kukushkin (1999), proves useful.
Since dominance solvability seems to have no implications for better reply dynamics
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anyway, we introduce an apparently new notion of BR-dominance solvability. A strategy
is called strongly BR-dominated if it is not among the best responses to any profile of
strategies of the partners. A strategy is weakly BR-dominated by another strategy of
the same player if the latter is among the best responses to a profile of strategies of the
partners whenever the former is; thus, a weakly BR-dominated strategy can be dispensed
with rather than is not needed at all. A game is called strongly (weakly) BR-dominance
solvable if iterative elimination of strongly (weakly) BR-dominated strategies produces
a game where all strategy profiles are Nash equilibria. Clearly, a strongly (weakly)
dominance solvable game is strongly (weakly) BR-dominance solvable; both converse
statements are wrong.
The iterative elimination of strongly BR-dominated strategies can be viewed as an
ordinal analogue of the rationalizability concept (Bernheim, 1984). Admittedly, there is
a serious difference between the two situations: If a pure strategy is not a best response to
any profile of mixed strategies of the partners, then it is dominated by a mixed strategy,
hence the latter provides a justification for the elimination of the former. When only
pure strategies are allowed, the fact that a strategy is not a best response to any profile
of strategies of the partners does not make it inferior to any other strategy. On the other
hand, the importance of the difference should not be overestimated either: the question
of which strategies are not needed by a player can only be resolved with a particular
scenario (or a list of scenarios) in view; e.g., the Stackelberg solution of a two person
game may well include the choice of a strongly dominated strategy by the leader. And it
is easy to see that the elimination of strongly BR-dominated strategies does not change
the set of Nash equilibria.
Be that as it may, it is strong BR-dominance solvability that ensures nice behavior of
both sequential and simultaneous tatonnement processes; in particular, if a finite game
satisfies the conditions of Moulin (1984), it is strongly BR-dominance solvable.
A very interesting feature of Moulin (1984) is an equivalence result (Corollary of
Lemmas 1 and 2), even though obtained in a rather special case. From our current
viewpoint, that result is just a fortunate coincidence: Generally, strong BR-dominance
solvability is sufficient for nice best response dynamics, whereas weak BR-dominance
solvability is necessary when there are two players. The latter is only sufficient for the
possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium from every strategy profile with a tatonnement
path. There seems to be no necessity result for more than two players.
Section 2 contains the basic definitions and facts about improvement dynamics in
strategic games; a new version of the acyclicity of improvements in a strategic game
is introduced, “finite inclusive best response improvement property”; some connections
between the convergence of simultaneous best response adjustments and individual best
response improvements are established. In Section 3, standard notions of (strong and
weak) dominance solvability are reproduced, and their “best response” modifications are
defined; the section also contains auxiliary results about the new concepts. Implications
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of strong BR-dominance solvability, Theorems 1–3, are given in Section 4: every simul-
taneous best response adjustment path reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of
steps; every individual best response improvement path does the same unless a player
is never given an opportunity to adapt. Theorems 4 and 5 about the necessity of weak
BR-dominance solvability are proven in Section 5; some “positive” implications of weak
BR-dominance solvability, in Section 6.
2 Improvement paths in strategic games
Our basic model is a strategic game with ordinal preferences. It is defined by a finite
set of players N , and strategy sets Xi and preference relations on XN =
∏
i∈N Xi for
all i ∈ N . We always assume that each Xi is finite and preferences are described with
ordinal utility functions ui : XN → R. For notational simplicity, we assume Xi ∩Xj = ∅
whenever i 6= j. For each i ∈ N , we denote X−i =
∏
j∈N\{i}Xj and
Ri(x−i) = Argmax
xi∈Xi
ui(xi, x−i)
for each x−i ∈ X−i (the best response correspondence); if #N = 2, then −i refers to the
partner of player i.
We introduce the individual improvement relationBInd and best response improvement
relation BBR on XN (i ∈ N , yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN BIndi xN ­ [y−i = x−i & ui(yN) > ui(xN)],
yN BInd xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN BIndi xN ];
yN BBRi xN ­ [y−i = x−i & xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi],
yN BBR xN ­ ∃i ∈ N [yN BBRi xN ].
By definition, a strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a
maximizer of BInd, i.e., if yN BInd xN is impossible for any yN ∈ XN . In a finite game,
xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of BBR.
A (best response) improvement path is a finite or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such
that xk+1N BInd xkN (xk+1N BBR xkN) whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined; henceforth, we
call such k admissible (for a given path).
As in Kukushkin et al. (2005), we combine the terminology of Monderer and Shapley
(1996), Milchtaich (1996), and Friedman and Mezzetti (2001). A game has the finite
improvement property (FIP) if it admits no infinite improvement path. A game has the
finite best response improvement property (FBRP) if it admits no infinite best response
improvement path. FIP (FBRP) means that every (best response) improvement path
reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. A game has the weak FIP
(weak FBRP) if, for every xN ∈ XN , there exists a finite (best response) improvement
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path {x0N , . . . , xmN} such that x0N = xN and xmN is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, FIP ⇒
FBRP ⇒ weak FBRP ⇒ weak FIP.
A Cournot potential is a strict order (irreflexive and transitive binary relation) Â on
XN such that yN Â xN whenever yN BBR xN ; a weak Cournot potential is a strict order
Â on XN such that, whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium, there is yN ∈ XN such
that yN BBR xN and yN Â xN . By Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 from Kukushkin (2004), a
finite game has the (weak) FBRP if and only if it admits a (weak) Cournot potential.
Henceforth, a best response improvement path will be called just a Cournot path; clearly,
the FBRP is equivalent to the absence of Cournot cycles.
A property intermediate between the FBRP and weak FBRP deserves attention.
We say that a player i ∈ N fully participates in a Cournot path {xkN}k=0,1,... if for
each admissible m ∈ N there is an admissible k ≥ m such that xki ∈ Ri(xk−i). A
Cournot path is inclusive if each player i ∈ N fully participates in it; a Cournot cycle
x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
m
N = x
0
N (m > 0) is complete if for each player i ∈ N there is k ≤ m such
that xki ∈ Ri(xk−i).
A game has the finite inclusive best response improvement property (FIBRP) if it
admits no infinite inclusive Cournot path. It is immediately clear that the sequential
tatonnement process as defined by Moulin (1984, p. 87) generates an inclusive Cournot
path. Therefore, the FIBRP implies, in particular, the convergence of such a process in
a finite number of steps.
A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation; with every preorder º, a strict
orderÂ and an equivalence relation∼ are naturally associated. A Cournot quasipotential
is a preorder º on XN such that for every xN ∈ XN there exists a subset M(xN) ⊆ N
satisfying
yN BBR xN ⇒
[
yN Â xN or [yN ∼ xN &M(yN) =M(xN) 6= ∅]
]
; (1a)
i ∈M(xN)⇒ xi /∈ Ri(x−i). (1b)
It immediately follows that yN Â xN whenever yN BBRi xN and i ∈ M(xN). If Â
is a Cournot potential, then its reflexive closure º is a Cournot quasipotential with
M(xN) = ∅ for all xN ∈ XN . If º is a Cournot quasipotential, then its asymmetric
component Â is a weak Cournot potential.
Proposition 2.1. For every finite strategic game Γ, the following statements are equiv-
alent:
1. Γ has the FIBRP;
2. Γ admits no complete Cournot cycle;
3. Γ admits a Cournot quasipotential.
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Proof. Infinite repetition of a complete Cournot cycle generates an infinite inclusive
Cournot path, hence Statement 1 implies Statement 2.
Let Statement 2 hold. To verify Statement 3, we denote º the reflexive and transitive
closure of BBR: yN º xN if and only if there is a finite Cournot path x0N , x1N , . . . , xmN such
that x0N = xN and x
m
N = yN (m ≥ 0). Let Y ⊆ XN be an equivalence class of ∼ with
#Y > 1; we denote D(Y ) = {i ∈ N | ∀xN ∈ Y [xi /∈ Ri(x−i)]}. Since all xN ∈ Y can
be arranged into a single Cournot cycle and that cycle cannot be complete, D(Y ) 6= ∅.
Now we define M(xN) = D(Y ) if xN belongs to a non-singleton equivalence class Y ,
and M(xN) = ∅ otherwise. The conditions (1) are checked easily.
Finally, let º be a Cournot quasipotential and {xkN}k=0,1,... be an infinite Cournot
path; we have to show that a player i ∈ N does not fully participate in the path. Since
XN is finite, at least one strategy profile x¯N must enter into the path an infinite number
of times. Let xmN = x¯N for the first time; clearly, we must have x
k+1
N ∼ xkN for all k ≥ m.
By (1a), M(xk+1N ) = M(x
k
N) = M
0 6= ∅ for all k ≥ m. By (1b), we have xki /∈ Ri(xk−i)
for all i ∈M0 and k ≥ m. Thus, each player i ∈M0 is not fully participating.
Corollary. If a finite two person game Γ has the FIBRP, then it has the FBRP.
Proof. By Proposition 2.1, Γ admits no complete Cournot cycle; on the other hand, best
response improvements by one player cannot form a cycle in any game.
Remark. In the proof of Theorem 3 of Kukushkin (2004), the FBRP was derived from
the presence of a “quasipotential” in an even weaker sense than (1). The point is that
whenever a game satisfies the conditions of that theorem, so do all its reduced games.
Generally, we only obtain FIBRP. In particular, dominance solvability (in any sense)
need not be inherited by the reduced games, hence Theorem 1 below also only asserts
FIBRP.
We introduce the simultaneous best response adjustment relation B∗BR on XN
(yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN B∗BR xN ­
( ∀i ∈ N [yi = xi ∈ Ri(x−i) or xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi] & yN 6= xN ).
In a finite game, xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of
B∗BR. A simultaneous Cournot path is a finite or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that
xk+1N B∗BR xkN whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined.
Remark. We do not use the term “improvement” here because yN B∗BR xN is compatible
with ui(yN) < ui(xN) for all i ∈ N .
A game has the finite simultaneous best response adjustment property (FSP) if there
exists no infinite simultaneous Cournot path. FSP implies that every simultaneous
Cournot path eventually leads to a Nash equilibrium. A game has the weak FSP if, for
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every xN ∈ XN , there exists a finite simultaneous Cournot path {x0N , . . . , xmN} such that
x0N = xN and x
m
N is a Nash equilibrium.
A simultaneous Cournot potential is a strict order Â on XN such that yN Â xN
whenever yN B∗BR xN ; a weak simultaneous Cournot potential is a strict order Â on
XN such that, whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium, there is yN ∈ XN such that
yN B∗BR xN and yN Â xN . By Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 from Kukushkin (2004), a
finite game has the (weak) FSP if and only if it admits a (weak) simultaneous Cournot
potential.
Proposition 2.2. If a finite two person game Γ has the (weak) FSP, then it has the
(weak) FBRP.
Proof. For every xN ∈ XN , we define
ν(xN) = #{i ∈ N | xi ∈ Ri(x−i)}. (2)
If ν(xN) = 2, then xN is a Nash equilibrium. If yN BBR xN , then ν(yN) ≥ 1. If
x0N , . . . , x
m
N = x
0
N (m > 0) is a Cournot cycle, then ν(x
k
N) = 1 for all k. If ν(xN) = 1,
then yN B∗BR xN is equivalent to yN BBR xN . Therefore, every Cournot cycle is a
simultaneous Cournot cycle, hence FSP implies FBRP.
Let Γ have the weak FSP and x0N ∈ XN ; then there is a simultaneous Cournot
path x0N , . . . , x
m
N such that x
m
N is a Nash equilibrium. If ν(x
0
N) = 1, then ν(x
k
N) = 1
as well for all k < m, hence the path is also a Cournot path. Let ν(x0N) = 0 and
ν(xkN) ≥ 1 for the first time when k = k¯ (0 < k¯ ≤ m). Without restricting generality,
we may assume xk¯1 ∈ R1(xk¯2). We denote yk¯+1N = xk¯N , y0N = x0N , yk¯−2hN = (xk¯−2h1 , xk¯−2h−12 )
(h = 0, 1, . . . , 2h + 1 ≤ k¯), and yk¯−2h−1N = (xk¯−2h−21 , xk¯−2h−12 ) (h = 0, 1, . . . , 2h + 1 < k¯).
It is immediately clear from the definitions that yk¯−2h1 ∈ R1(yk¯−2h−12 ), yk¯−2h2 = yk¯−2h−12 ,
yk¯−2h−12 ∈ R2(yk¯−2h−21 ), and yk¯−2h−11 = yk¯−2h−21 for all admissible h. (If k¯ is odd, then
player 1 moves from x0N = y
0
N to y
1
N ; if k¯ is even, it is player 2.) For every k = 0, 1, . . . , k¯,
either yk+1N BBR ykN or ykN is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we have obtained a Cournot
path starting at x0N = y
0
N and ending either at a Nash equilibrium or at x
k¯
N with
ν(xk¯N) = 1. In the first case, we are home immediately; in the second, we recall that
xk¯N , . . . , x
m
N is a Cournot path.
When there are more than two players, there seems to be no relation between the
convergence of Cournot paths and simultaneous Cournot paths (see Moulin, 1986).
3 Elimination of dominated strategies
Let Γ be a strategic game, i ∈ N , and xi, yi ∈ Xi. We call yi and xi equivalent, yi ≈ xi,
if ui(yi, x−i) = ui(xi, x−i) for all x−i ∈ X−i. We say that yi strongly dominates xi,
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yi ≫ xi, if for every x−i ∈ X−i, there holds ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i). We say that yi
weakly dominates xi, yi À xi, if ui(yi, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i) for every x−i ∈ X−i, while
ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i) for some x−i ∈ X−i. A strategy yi ∈ Xi is strongly (weakly)
dominant if yi ≫ xi (yi À xi) for any xi 6= yi. A strategy xi ∈ Xi is strongly (weakly)
dominated if there exists yi ∈ Xi such that yi ≫ xi (yi À xi).
A fragment Γ′ of Γ is a strategic game with the same set of players N , nonempty
subsets ∅ 6= X ′i ⊆ Xi for all i ∈ N , and the restrictions of the same utility functions to
X ′N =
∏
i∈N X
′
i. Let X
′
i contain both yi and xi. Then the relations yi ≈ xi or yi ≫ xi
in Γ imply the same relations in Γ′; if yi À xi in Γ, then either yi ≈ xi or yi À xi in Γ′.
Given a strategic game Γ, an elimination scheme of the length m > 0 is a mapping
ξ : {1, . . . ,m} → ⋃i∈N Xi; we associate with the scheme a sequence of fragments Γk of
Γ: Γ0 = Γ; Xki = Xi \ ξ({1, . . . , k}) for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and i ∈ N . It is convenient
to allow also an elimination scheme of the length 0, which means just taking Γ0 = Γ.
An elimination scheme of the length m ≥ 0 is perfect if yi ≈ xi in Γm for every i ∈ N
and yi, xi ∈ Xmi (hence every xN ∈ XmN is a Nash equilibrium in Γm).
A game Γ is strongly dominance solvable if it admits a perfect elimination scheme
such that, for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the deleted strategy ξ(k) is strongly dominated in
Γk−1. A game Γ is weakly dominance solvable if it admits a perfect elimination scheme
such that, for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there is κ(k) < k such that the deleted strategy ξ(k)
is weakly dominated in Γκ(k).
Remark. When strongly dominated strategies are iteratively deleted, the result does
not depend on the details of the process. The latter may very much matter in the case
of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies; the presence of κ(k) in our definition
allows for both simultaneous and sequential elimination.
With a slight abuse, we denote R−1i (xi) = {x−i ∈ X−i | xi ∈ Ri(x−i)}. A strategy
xi ∈ Xi is strongly BR-dominated if R−1i (xi) = ∅. A strategy xi ∈ Xi is weakly BR-dom-
inated by yi ∈ Xi, yi ºº xi, if yi 6= xi and R−1i (xi) ⊆ R−1i (yi); note that the relation ºº
need not even be asymmetric. It is immediately clear that a strongly (weakly) domi-
nated strategy is strongly (weakly) BR-dominated, and that a strongly BR-dominated
strategy is weakly BR-dominated by any other.
An S-scheme (W-scheme) is an elimination scheme ξ of the length m such that,
for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the deleted strategy ξ(k) is strongly (weakly) BR-dominated
in Γk−1. We call Γ strongly (weakly) BR-dominance solvable if it admits a perfect
S-scheme (W-scheme). Since equivalent strategies weakly BR-dominate each other, the
elimination of weakly BR-dominated strategies can be continued until each Xmi is a
singleton; however, it is technically more convenient to have all definitions as similar to
one another as possible.
Since BR-dominance solvability seems to have never been studied in the literature,
we provide detailed proofs of familiar results in the new context. Two implications
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are obvious: a strongly dominance solvable game is strongly BR-dominance solvable
with the same elimination scheme; a strongly BR-dominance solvable game is weakly
BR-dominance solvable with the same elimination scheme.
Proposition 3.1. If Γ is weakly dominance solvable, then Γ is weakly BR-dominance
solvable with the same elimination scheme.
Proof. At every step k, the deleted strategy ξ(k) ∈ Xk−1i is weakly dominated in Γκ(k):
yi À ξ(k) with yi ∈ Xκ(k)i . The strategy yi need not belong to Xk−1i , but the transitivity
of À implies that there is k′ < k and y′i ∈ Xk−1i such that y′i À ξ(k) in Γk′ . Clearly,
y′i 6= ξ(k) and either y′i À ξ(k) or y′i ≈ ξ(k) in Γk−1; therefore, y′i ºº ξ(k) in Γk−1, i.e.,
ξ(k) is weakly BR-dominated in Γk−1.
Proposition 3.2. If xN is a Nash equilibrium in Γ and ξ is an S-scheme of the length
m, then xN ∈ XmN .
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let k be the first step when xN /∈ XkN ; then xi = ξ(k)
and x−i ∈ Xk−1−i for some i ∈ N . On the other hand, xi ∈ Ri(x−i) in Γ, hence it cannot
be BR-dominated in Γk−1: a contradiction.
Lemma 3.3. Let ξ be a W-scheme of the length m; then Ri(x−i) ∩ Xki 6= ∅ whenever
i ∈ N , k ≤ m, and x−i ∈ Xk−i.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let h ≥ 0 be the first step when Ri(x−i) ∩ Xh+1i = ∅.
Then ξ(h + 1) ∈ Ri(x−i); by definition, there is yi ∈ Xh+1i such that yi ºº ξ(h + 1) in
Γh. Since x−i ∈ Xk−i ⊆ Xh+1−i , we obtain yi ∈ Ri(x−i) ∩ Xh+1i , which contradicts the
definition of h.
Proposition 3.4. If Γ is weakly BR-dominance solvable and xN ∈ XmN , then xN is a
Nash equilibrium in Γ.
Proof. For each i ∈ N , we apply Lemma 3.3 to x−i ∈ Xm−i and pick yi ∈ Ri(x−i) ∩Xmi .
By definition, yi ≈ xi in Γm, hence xi ∈ Ri(x−i) as well.
Propositions 3.2 and 3.4 immediately imply that the set of Nash equilibria in a
strongly BR-dominance solvable game is rectangular, and all perfect S-schemes eliminate
the strategies not participating in the equilibria.
4 Strong BR-dominance solvability
First, we show that weak and strong BR-dominance solvability are equivalent under the
uniqueness of best responses as assumed in Moulin (1984).
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Lemma 4.1. If Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then every
W-scheme is an S-scheme.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, we must have a stage k (1 ≤ k ≤ m) when the deleted,
weakly BR-dominated strategy ξ(k) ∈ Xi is not strongly BR-dominated in Γk−1, i.e.,
is a best response to x−i ∈ Xk−1−i . Let Ri(x−i) = {yi}; applying Lemma 3.3, we obtain
yi ∈ Xk−1i , hence yi is a unique best response to x−i in Γk−1. Thus, ξ(k) could be a best
response to x−i in Γk−1 only if ξ(k) = yi; however, yi is not weakly BR-dominated in
Γk−1.
Proposition 4.2. If Γ is weakly BR-dominance solvable and Ri(x−i) is a singleton for
every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Lemma 4.1.
Let us introduce some useful notations and an auxiliary result. Given an elimination
scheme ξ of the length m, we define µ :
⋃
i∈N Xi → {1, . . . ,m+ 1} by
µ(ξ(k)) = k; (3a)
µ(xi) = m+ 1 if xi /∈ ξ({1, . . . ,m}). (3b)
We also define µ− : XN → {1, . . . ,m+ 1} by
µ−(xN) = min
i∈N
µ(xi). (3c)
As long as µ(xi) ≤ m, µ is injective, hence Argmini∈N µ(xi) is a singleton whenever
µ−(xN) ≤ m.
Lemma 4.3. Let ξ be an S-scheme of the length m and xN ∈ XN be such that µ−(xN) ≤
m; then for every i ∈ N and yi ∈ Ri(x−i), there holds µ(yi) > µ−(xN).
Proof. If µ(yi) = k ≤ µ−(xN) ≤ m, then yi is strongly BR-dominated in Γk−1; since
x−i ∈ Xµ
−(xN )−1
−i ⊆ Xk−1−i , this is incompatible with yi ∈ Ri(x−i).
Theorem 1. If a finite game Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable, then it has the
FIBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme ξ, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (3).
Let us show that the preorder represented by µ−, i.e., yN º xN ­ µ−(yN) ≥ µ−(xN),
is a Cournot quasipotential with M(xN) = Argmini∈N µ(xi) when µ
−(xN) ≤ m and
M(xN) = ∅ otherwise. If µ−(xN) = m + 1, then xN ∈ XmN , hence xN is a Nash
equilibrium in Γ by Proposition 3.4.
Let yN BBRi xN ; then µ−(xN) ≤ m, hence Lemma 4.3 is applicable. If i /∈ M(xN),
then µ−(yN) = µ−(xN) and M(yN) = M(xN); if i ∈ M(xN), then µ−(yN) > µ−(xN)
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because M(xN) = {i}. We see that condition (1a) holds. Finally, if i ∈ M(xN), then
µ(xi) = µ
−(xN) ≤ m; if xi ∈ Ri(x−i), then Lemma 4.3 would imply µ(xi) > µ(xi).
Thus, (1b) holds as well.
Theorem 2. If a finite two person game Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable, then it
has the FBRP.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary to Proposi-
tion 2.1.
The FBRP in the formulation of Theorem 2 cannot be replaced with the FIP: if one
player has a strongly dominant strategy x+i , then any behavior of improvement paths
with xki 6= x+i is compatible with strong dominance solvability. For the same reason, the
FIBRP cannot be replaced with the FBRP in Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. If a finite game Γ is strongly BR-dominance solvable, then it has the FSP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme ξ, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (3).
Let us show that the strict order represented by µ−, i.e., yN Â xN ­ µ−(yN) > µ−(xN),
is a simultaneous Cournot potential. Let yN B∗BR xN ; then µ−(xN) ≤ m. By Lemma 4.3,
µ(yi) > µ
−(xN) for every i ∈ N , hence µ−(yN) > µ−(xN) as well.
If Γ is only weakly dominance solvable, all the three theorems become wrong.
Example 4.1. Let us consider a three person 2 × 3 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses
rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):[
(3, 3, 3) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2)
(3, 3, 3) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1)
] [
(0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1)
]
.
Nash equilibria fill the left column of the left matrix; however, none of the underlined
strategy profiles could be connected to any equilibrium with an individual improvement
path or with a simultaneous Cournot path. Thus, the game does not have even the weak
FIP or the weak FSP. On the other hand, it is weakly dominance solvable: The choice
of the left matrix weakly dominates the choice of the right matrix; when the latter is
deleted, the left column becomes strongly dominant.
Example 4.2. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0)
(2, 2) (1, 0) (1, 0)
.
The bottom row and the left column are weakly dominant; the southwestern corner of
the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. The underlined fragment is a Cournot cycle
(hence a simultaneous Cournot cycle as well).
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5 On the necessity of BR-dominance solvability
None of the theorems from Section 4 admits a converse. For Theorems 1 and 2, this is
shown by the Battle of Sexes, which has the FIP, but is not even weakly BR-dominance
solvable; for Theorem 3, by the following example.
Example 5.1. Let us consider a two person 2× 2 game:
(1, 1) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (1, 1)
.
There are two Nash equilibria: the northwestern and southeastern corners. Simultaneous
best response adjustment from any other strategy profile immediately produces a Nash
equilibrium, so the game has the FSP. On the other hand, each strategy of player 1
is the unique best response to a strategy of the partner; each strategy of player 2 is
a best response to each strategy of the partner. Therefore, the game is not strongly
BR-dominance solvable.
Nonetheless, some necessity results can be obtained here.
Lemma 5.1. For every finite two person game Γ, at least one of the following statements
holds:
1. Every strategy set Xi is a singleton.
2. Γ admits a simultaneous Cournot cycle.
3. There is a weakly BR-dominated strategy in Γ.
Proof. Let Statements 1 and 2 not hold. If every strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash
equilibrium, then all strategies of the same player are equivalent, hence Statement 3
holds. Otherwise, there is, at least, one pair of strategy profiles such that yN B∗BR xN .
Since there is no simultaneous Cournot cycle, we can pick an xN ∈ XN which is not a
Nash equilibrium and for which xN B∗BR x′N is impossible for any x′N ∈ XN .
For each i ∈ N , we denote X ′−i = R−1i (xi) ⊆ X−i. If X ′i = ∅ for an i ∈ N ,
then xi is even strongly BR-dominated and we are home. Let X
′
N = X
′
1 × X ′2 6= ∅.
Since xN is not a Nash equilibrium, there must be i ∈ N and x0i ∈ X ′i such that
x0i 6= xi. If R−1i (x0i ) ⊇ X ′−i, then x0i ºº xi and we are home again; otherwise, there is
x0−i ∈ X ′−i such that x0i /∈ Ri(x0−i). Since xN B∗BR x0N is assumed impossible, we must
have x−i 6= x0−i ∈ R−i(x0i ). Again, if R−1−i (x0−i) ⊇ X ′i, then x0−i ºº x−i. Otherwise, there
is x1i ∈ X ′i such that x0−i /∈ R−i(x1i ); we denote x1N = (x1i , x0−i) ∈ X ′N . Since xN B∗BR x1N
is assumed impossible, we must have xi 6= x1i ∈ Ri(x0−i); therefore, x1N B∗BR x0N . Again,
if R−1i (x
1
i ) ⊇ X ′−i, then x1i ºº xi; otherwise, there is x2−i ∈ X ′−i such that x1i /∈ Ri(x2−i).
We denote x2N = (x
1
i , x
2
−i) ∈ X ′N ; again, x2N B∗BR x1N B∗BR x0N , and so on.
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Since there is no simultaneous Cournot cycle, the simultaneous Cournot path
x0N , x
1
N , . . . cannot be infinite. On the other hand, the next profile x
k+1
N cannot be
defined only if xki ºº xi for an i ∈ N . Thus, Statement 3 holds.
Theorem 4. If a finite two person game Γ has the FSP, then it is weakly BR-dominance
solvable.
Proof. We apply Lemma 5.1. If XN is a singleton, Γ is even strong BR-dominance
solvable. Statement 2 cannot hold by the FSP assumption. Therefore, there is a weakly
BR-dominated strategy xi. The elimination of xi defines a W-scheme of the length 1
and a fragment Γ1. By Lemma 3.3, we have R1i (x−i) = Ri(x−i) ∩X1i for all i ∈ N and
x−i ∈ X1−i; therefore, the relation B∗BR in Γ1 is the restriction of B∗BR in Γ to X1N , hence
Γ1 also has the FSP, hence Lemma 5.1 applies again. The process only stops when XmN is
a singleton; then the W-scheme will be perfect (it may become so even before that).
For more than two players, Theorem 4 is wrong.
Example 5.2. Let us consider a three person 2 × 2 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses
rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):[
(2, 1, 2) (4, 4, 4)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 3, 3)
] [
(0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 1)
(4, 4, 4) (0, 0, 0)
]
.
The two Nash equilibria are not underlined. Each of the three strategy profiles underlined
once is dominated in the sense of B∗BR only by a Nash equilibrium; each of the three
strategy profiles underlined twice is dominated in the same sense only by a strategy
profile underlined once. Thus, the game has the FSP. On the other hand, each strategy
of each player is a unique best response to a strategy profile of the partners. Therefore,
the game is not weakly BR-dominance solvable.
The Battle of Sexes shows that the FSP in Theorem 4 cannot be replaced with the
FBRP (or even FIP). This becomes possible under an additional assumption that the
set of Nash equilibria is rectangular (Theorem 5 below).
Lemma 5.2. For every finite two person game Γ, at least one of the following statements
holds:
1. Every strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium.
2. Γ admits a Cournot cycle.
3. The set of Nash equilibria in Γ is not rectangular.
4. There are i ∈ N and yi, xi ∈ Xi such that R−1i (yi) ⊂ R−1i (xi) (hence xi ºº yi).
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Proof. Let Statements 1, 2, and 3 not hold. We have to show that Statement 4 holds.
If there is a strongly BR-dominated strategy in Γ, we are home immediately; suppose
there is none.
For each i ∈ N , there is X0i ⊆ Xi such that X0N = X1N × X2N is the set of Nash
equilibria of Γ; therefore, R−1i (x
0
i ) ⊇ X0−i for both i ∈ N and all x0i ∈ X0i . We pick an
xN ∈ XN \X0N 6= ∅ and start a Cournot path from xN ; since Γ has the FBRP, the path
must end at an x0N ∈ X0N ; therefore, R−1i (x0i ) ⊃ X0−i for an i ∈ N .
We define a binary relation B on Xi:
yi B xi ­ ∃x−i ∈ X−i [xi /∈ Ri(x−i) 3 yi & x−i ∈ R−i(xi) & x−i /∈ R−i(yi)]. (4)
Let us show that B is acyclic. Supposing to the contrary that x0i , x1i , . . . , xmi = x0i are
such that xk+1i B xki for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, we pick, for each k, an xk−i from (4).
Then we define x2kN = (x
k
i , x
k
−i) and x
2k+1
N = (x
k+1
i , x
k
−i) for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1. It
follows immediately from (4) that x0N , x
1
N , . . . , x
2m
N = x
0
N is a Cournot cycle in Γ, i.e.,
Statement 2 holds.
Since Xi is finite and B is acyclic, there is yi ∈ Xi such that yi B xi does not hold
for any xi ∈ Xi. For every x−i ∈ R−1i (yi), we consider two alternatives: If x−i ∈ R−i(yi),
then (yi, x−i) is a Nash equilibrium, hence x−i ∈ X0−i. If x−i /∈ R−i(yi), then we pick
xi ∈ R−1−i (x−i) 6= ∅; then xi ∈ Ri(x−i) because we would have yi B xi otherwise; therefore,
(xi, x−i) is a Nash equilibrium, hence x−i ∈ X0−i again. Thus, R−1i (yi) ⊆ X0−i ⊂ R−1i (x0i ),
i.e., Statement 4 holds.
Theorem 5. If a finite two person game Γ has the FBRP and the set of Nash equilibria
in Γ is rectangular, then Γ is weakly BR-dominance solvable.
Proof. We apply Lemma 5.2 in the same way as Lemma 5.1 was applied in the proof of
Theorem 4.
Statement 4 of Lemma 5.2 implies that Γ in Theorem 5 is “not so weakly” BR-dom-
inance solvable. Example 5.1 shows that a similar strengthening of Theorem 4 would be
wrong. If weak BR-dominance solvability is replaced with strong one, or if more than
two players are allowed, Theorem 5 becomes wrong.
Example 5.3. Let us consider a two person 2× 2 game:
(0, 2) (2, 0)
(1, 1) (1, 1)
.
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The game obviously has the FIP.
On the other hand, each strategy of each player is a best response to a strategy of the
partner; therefore, the game is not strongly BR-dominance solvable.
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Example 5.4. Let us consider a three person 2 × 2 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses
rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):[
(3, 4, 3) (0, 0, 0)
(5, 5, 5) (4, 3, 4)
] [
(2, 2, 1) (1, 1, 2)
(0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 1)
]
.
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium; the FBRP is easy to check. On
the other hand, each strategy of each player is the unique best response to a strategy
profile of the partners. Therefore, the game is not weakly BR-dominance solvable.
6 Weak BR-dominance solvability
Lemma 6.1. Let ξ be a W-scheme of the length m and xN ∈ XN be such that µ−(xN) =
k ≤ m; then for each i ∈ N there is yi ∈ Ri(x−i) such that µ(yi) > µ−(xN).
Proof. We pick yi maximizing µ over Ri(x−i). Lemma 3.3 implies µ(yi) ≥ k for each i ∈
N because x−i ∈ Xk−1−i . If µ(xi) > k, then µ(yi) > k because µ is injective; let µ(xi) = k.
If xi /∈ Ri(x−i), we have yi 6= xi, hence µ(yi) > µ(xi) = k. Otherwise, we pick x′i ∈ Xk−1i
such that x′i ºº xi in Γk−1, hence x′i ∈ Ri(x−i) too, hence µ(yi) ≥ µ(x′i) ≥ k + 1.
Theorem 6. If a finite two person game is weakly BR-dominance solvable, then it has
the weak FSP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect W-scheme ξ, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (3),
and introduce a binary relation on XN :
yN Â xN ­
[
µ−(yN) > µ−(xN) or
∃i ∈ N [µ−(xN) = µ(xi) = µ−(yN) & xi ∈ Ri(x−i) & x−i /∈ R−i(xi) 3 y−i]
]
. (5)
The relation is obviously irreflexive; the transitivity is obvious as long as the first disjunc-
tive term in (5) is applicable. Let yN Â xN by the second term. Since x−i /∈ R−i(xi), we
have µ−(yN) ≤ m, hence the minimizing i ∈ N is unique and xi = yi. Now if zN Â yN ,
then the second disjunctive term in (5) cannot be valid because y−i ∈ R−i(yi), hence
µ−(zN) > µ−(yN) = µ−(xN), hence zN Â xN by the first term in (5). Similarly, if
xN Â zN , then the second term in (5) cannot be valid because x−i /∈ R−i(xi), hence
µ−(yN) = µ−(xN) > µ−(zN), hence yN Â zN .
Let us show that Â is a weak simultaneous Cournot potential; let xN ∈ XN . If
xi ∈ Ri(x−i) for both i, then xN is a Nash equilibrium already; otherwise, µ−(xN) ≤ m,
hence µ−(xN) = µ(xi) for a unique i. We define yi = xi if xi ∈ Ri(x−i), and pick yi
maximizing µ over Ri(x−i) otherwise. Clearly, yN B∗BR xN ; let us show yN Â xN .
By Lemma 6.1, µ−(yN) ≥ µ−(xN). If the inequality is strict, the first disjunctive
term in (5) works. Otherwise, we have yi = xi, hence xi ∈ Ri(x−i) by the definition of
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yi; besides, y−i ∈ R−i(xi) by the same definition. Since xN is not a Nash equilibrium,
x−i /∈ R−i(xi). Thus, yN Â xN by the second disjunctive term in (5).
Theorem 7. If a finite two person game is weakly BR-dominance solvable, then it has
the weak FBRP.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 6 and Proposition 2.2.
In the light of Theorems 4–7, it seems appropriate to show that the weak FSP does
not imply even weak BR-dominance solvability.
Example 6.1. Let us consider a two person 6× 6 game defined by the left matrix:
(3, 3) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(0, 0) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1)
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(1, 2) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1)

0 4 2 4 4 2
3 4 3 4 5 3
3 4 4 5 4 3
5 5 5 6 5 6
3 4 3 4 4 3
1 5 2 5 4 2

.
The northwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The weak FSP is easy to check:
the right matrix shows the length of the shortest simultaneous Cournot path leading to
the equilibrium from every strategy profile. On the other hand, none of the sets R−1i (xi)
include each other for either i ∈ N , even if non-strict inclusion is taken into account.
Therefore, there is no weakly BR-dominated strategy.
For more than two players, both Theorems 6 and 7 are wrong as Example 4.1 shows;
only a “very weak” FSP, or a “very weak” FBRP, are then ensured. An individual
best response path is a finite or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that, whenever xk+1
is defined, there is i ∈ N for which xk+1−i = xk−i, xk+1i 6= xki , and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i). A
simultaneous best response path is a finite or infinite sequence {xkN}k=0,1,... such that
xk+1 6= xk and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i) for all i ∈ N whenever xk+1 is defined.
Theorem 8. If a finite game is weakly BR-dominance solvable, then every strategy
profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path.
Proof. As above, if µ−(xN) = m+1, then xN is already a Nash equilibrium. Otherwise,
we pick yi maximizing µ over Ri(x−i) for each i ∈ N ; clearly, {xN , yN} is a simultaneous
best response path. By Lemma 6.1, µ−(yN) > µ−(xN). If yN is not a Nash equilibrium,
we make a similar step, and so on. Thus we obtain a simultaneous best response path
along which µ− strictly increases until a Nash equilibrium is reached.
Theorem 9. If a finite game is weakly BR-dominance solvable, then every strategy
profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with an individual best response path.
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Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 8 and a straightforward mod-
ification of the proof of Proposition 2.2.
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